Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1960

Eddie Hoogland v. Thomas B. Child et al : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Regnal W. Garff, Jr.; Franklyn B. Matheson; Gordon I. Hyde; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Hoogland v. Child, No. 9295 (Utah Supreme Court, 1960).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3738

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH

EDDIE HOOGLAND,
by his Guardian ad Litem,
Roelof Hoogland,
Plaintiff arnd Appellant,

- vs.-

THOMAS B. CHILD and
C. W. CHILD,
dba THOMAS B. CHILD & CO.;
JACK ALDER and ROBERT R.
CHILD, dba ALDER-CHILD
CONSTRUCTION CO.

Case
No. 9295

Defenda;nts amd Respondents.

APPELLANT''S BRIEF
REGNAL W. GARFF, JR.,
FRANKLYN B. MATHESON, and
GORDON I. HYDE
Attorneys for
Plaintiff and Appellam,t

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

STATEMENT OF FACTS..................................................................

1

STATEMENT OF POINTS ······--·-··········-··--···-··------··-----········-···········

4

ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................

5

POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS:
(1) GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS DO
EXIST
(2) QUESTIONS PECULIAR TO THE ATTRACTIVE
NUISANCE DOCTRINE SHOULD BE TRIED
(3) THE FACTS ALLEGED MUST BE CONSIDERED
AND APPLIED IN A MANNER MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION............

5

POINT II.
THE DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF UNDER WHAT IS COMMONLY CALLED THE
PLAYGROUND DOCTRINE ......................................................

11

POINT III.
THE DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF UNDER THE DOTRINE COMMONLY KNOWN
AS THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE................

14

CONCLUSION ·············-------------------·-······················-···-··········-·----···········

19

Cases Cited
Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 U. 223, 93 P. 570................................

18

Christiansen v. L.A. & S. L. R. Co., 77 U. 85, 291 Pac. 926, p. 90

9

Ellerbeck v. Continental Casualty Co., 63 U. 530, 227 Pac.
805, p. 540 ·-·---·····-------·--··--·----------·------·-------·------·-----------·---·----·······-.

9

Ford v. Blythe Bros. Co., 87 S.E. 2d 879---------------··---------------------······
Giddings v. Superior Oil Co., 235 P. 2d 843......................................

9
8, 9

Harris v. Mentes-Williams Co., 95 A. 2d 388.·---------------------·--··-·······

9

Kahn v. James Burton Co., 126 N.E. 2d 836-------··-·······-·····-·········---

9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS -

(Continued)
Page

Keck v. Woodring, 208 Pac. 2d 1133·-------------------------------·········-----------8, 9, 19
Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Earles, 22 S.W. 2d 929 ... --------·············--------

8

Little v. McCord, 151 S.W. 835·---··------------------------------------------------------

19

Lone Star Gas Co. v. Parsons, 14 Pac. 2d 369·-----------------------------------

18

Mosely v. Kansas City, 228 P. 2d 843·-------------------------------------------------

8

Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Lester, 242 S.W. 2d 714---------------------------·-···

8

Powers v. Harlow, 19 N.W. 257-----------------------------------------------------------Robinson v. Salt Lake City, 37 Utah 520, 109 Pac. 817,
pp. 527-8, Utah Reports---------------------------------------------------------------Verrichia v. Society Di M. S. Del Laxio, 79 A. 2d 237____________________

19

Vills v. Cloquet, 138 N.W. 33----------------------------------------------------------------

19

Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F. 2d 344.... --------------------------------

7

Young v. Telornia, 121 U. 646, 244 P. 2d 862.-----------------------------------

8

10
9

Authorities Cited
Moore, Federal Practice, Sees. 56.17, 56.04----------------------------------------7, 8, 14
Personal Injury, Actions-Defenses-Damages, Sec. 1.03(2)............

11

Restatement of Torts, Sec. 339·----------------------------------------------------------·

15

Statutes Cited
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 (c)----------------------------------------

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

EJ)DIE IfOOGLAND,
by his Guardian ad Litem,
Roelof Hoogland,
Plaintiff and Appellanl,
--

"~/S.-

THO~fAS

B. CHILD and
C. W. CHILD,
dba THOMAS B.CHIL.D & CO.;
J..:tCK ALDER and ROBERT R.
CHILD, dba. ALDER-CHILD
CONSTRUCTION CO.
Defendants and Respondents.

Case
No. 9295

APP·ELLANT.'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF F·1ACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
BELOW
This is an action brought by the Guardian of the
plaintiff, Eddie Hoogland, a minor, for injuries resulting in the amputation of both of his legs, and other permanent injuries when an explosive compound, which 'vas
stored on the property of the defendants, blew up.
1
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The defendant, Thomas B. Child, is the owner of
property located at 452 South 8th East Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah. This property had for many years been
a place of curiosity due to the fact that this defendant
had carved large figures and statues from stone which
were arranged about the yard, many weighing as much
as 25 to 40 tons. (See Deposition, Thomas B. Child, pp.
23, 24 and 25.) These premises were a great curiosity and
operated in the nature of a park. No effort was ever
made to secure the gate leading into the property, and
the defendant was aware that children frequented the
yard. (See Deposition, Thomas B. Child, p. 23, lines
3-14; p. 26, lines 3-26. )'' Q. And people have come from all over the area
who were curious to see this work and try to
figure out what you were driving at, isn't
that true~~

A. Yes.
Q. And the gates were open, and the people come
in, and the people look, isn't that true¥

A. Yes.',. (Deposition, Thomas B. Child, pp.
25-26.)
The property was used so frequently as a playground by
the children in the neighborhood that it kept the defendant quite busy attempting to restrict the play, and though
he advised the children that they had no right in the
yard, yet the defendant made no effort to secure the
property so that the children could not make a playground of it. (See Deposition, Thomas B. Child, p. 26.)
In the yard, pursuant to agreement with Thomas: B.
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Child, the defendants, Alder-Child Construction Co., and
rrhomas B. Child, stored various rna terials used in the
construction business, including dangerous acids and
other compounds. In the yard was a shed which could be
locked, but nevertheless the acids and other compounds
were kept outside in the yard where children playing·
could have ready access to them, because the defendant
felt the fumes would damage the machinery which was
locked in the shed. The defendant was fully aware of the
danger of these compounds to children playing in the
yard:

"Q. Did it ever occur to you that children might
get into the acids and get hurt~
A. Well, it might occur to anybody else, but I
store it just like the big companies do their
acids. They keep them on the platform and
things around.

Q. I ask you if it occurred to you that children
might come into the yard and be hurt.
A. Yes.

Q. That occurred to

you~

A. Sure." (Deposition, Thomas B. Child, p. 30.)
On or about the 17th of February, 1957, the plaintiff
was attracted onto the premises by the statues, machinery,
barrels, and other contents located thereon. He explored
the contents of the barrel containing the explosive material by holding a lighted match or torch by the barrel
opening. It thereupon exploded, causing the above
described serious injuries.

3
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Plaintiff, by his Guardian, filed suit against the defendants for damage. The defendants made a motion for
Summary Judgment, the District Court granted said motion, and from that judgment the plaintiff appeals.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS:
(1) GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS
DO EXIST.
(2) QUESTIONS PECULIAR TO THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE SHOULD
BE TRIED.
(3) THE FACTS ALLEGED MUST BE CONSIDERED AND APPLIED IN A MANNER
MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF'S
CAUSE OF ACTION.
PoiNT

II.

THE DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE TO THE
PLAINTIFF UNDER WHAT IS COMMONLY
CALLED THE PLAYGROUND DOCTRINE.
PoiNT

III.

THE DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE TO THE
PLAINTIFF UNDER THE DOCTRINE COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE.
4
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ARGUMENT
PoiNT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS:
(1) GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS
DO EXIST.
(2) QUESTIONS PECULIAR TO THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE SHOULD
BE TRIED.
(3) THE FACTS ALLEGED MUST BE CONSIDERED AND APPLIED IN A MANNER
MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF'S
CAUSE OF ACTION.
(1) In granting Summary Judgment to the defendants, Jack Alder and Robert R. Child, the trial court
found all of the following facts : (See Record, page 81)
(a) The drum of Seal-Tex was not an unusual and
extraordinary thing.
(b) Said drum was not dangerous per se, or if so
there was no reason for said defendants to
think it so.
(c) Said defendants did not know or had no reason to know the Seal-Tex was dangerous
to children.
(d) The Seal-Tex did not attract the plaintiff onto
the premises involved.
(e) The plaintiff used the Seal-Tex in an unordinary and unexpected way.
(f) The plaintiff was not one of tender years
within the Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance.
5
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(g) The plaintiff knew the Seal-Tex was dan
gerous.
(h) The premises involved were not used as a
playground, or, at least, said defendants
didn't know so.
It is of great interest that the trial judge could conclude all these facts. For him to do so he must have had
complete trust in the credibility of deponent Robert B.
Child - and to the contrary had no faith whatsoever in
the deponent plaintiff. It is fascinating that the trial
judge could be so overwhelmingly persuaded of all these
facts by a deponent who, as a civil engineer, first categorically denied any knowledge of the organic nature
of asphalt and then in direct contradiction acknowledged
that asphalt is made of sand and gravel mixed with an
oil base. (Deposition, Robert R. Child, p. 13, lines 23 to 27)
In granting Summary Judgment to defendant
rrhomas B. Child, the trial judge found the same series
of facts as recited above, plus the fact that defendant
Thomas B. Child had no actual or constructive knowledge that the drum involved contained Seal-Tex, or that
said product was stored on his premises. These findings
are apparently based on the deposition of said defendant
Child and again apparently prompted by implicit faith in
the statements of said deponent. To belieYe that the yard
of said defendant "\vas not a playground, to believe that
children did not go on the yard, to belieYe that the yard
was not attractive to children and the Seal-Tex stored
there not dangerous, and to believe that the plain tiff "\Yas
not of tender years, one must completely ignore the fact
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of the explosion, the deposition of the plaintiff, and the
allegations of the complaint. It would seem impossible to
eo11elude that no issue exists as to these material facts. It
would also seem that the trial judge in awarding Summary Judgment in this matter considered the facts in
a light most favorable to the defendants. And it would
seem tragic that a boy, severely burned, both legs destroyed, and deprived forever of a normal life, should be
denied at least the chance of a day in court to tell his
story, because of such error by the trial judge.
Rule 56 (c) URCL reads in part as follows :
''The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law ... ''
The trial judge must find that no genuine issue as to
any material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. "If ... there is
a genuine issue as to a material fact, the case should
go to trial." (Moore, FederaZ Practice, Section 56.04)
"A summary judgment is a judgment in bar that results
from an application of substantive law to facts that established beyond reasonable controversy.'' (Ibid, Section
56.11) ''All doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue
as to a material fact must be resolved against the party
moving for a summary judgment.'' (Weisser v. M ursam
Shoe Corp., 1942, 127 F. 2d 344) "Under this rule (Rule
56 (c) ) it is clear that if there is any genuine issue as to
7
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any material fact, the motion should be denied.'' (Young
v. Telornria, 1952, 121 U. 646, 244 P. 2d 862) We submit
that there are genuine issues as to all those facts found
by the trial judge.
( 2) ''Here we start with the general proposition that
issues of negligence, including such related issues as contributory negligence, are ordinarily not susceptible of
summary adjudication either for or against the claimant,
but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner.''
(Moore, supra, Sect. 56.17 ( 42).) In the very case by
which the Utah supreme court adopted the attractive
nuisance rule (Brown v. Salt Lake City, 1908, 33 U. 223,
93 P. 570) the court indicated that should it be trying the
facts it would have arrived at a different conclusion than
that reached by the jury, but that the trial court was correct in charging the jury with questions as to the attractiveness of the danger, whether or not the alleged danger
"\vas in fact dangerous, whether defendant was responsible
for the danger and whether or not the defendant should
have foreseen that the danger might he injurious to children. Other jurisdictions have held similarly that the following are jury questions :
(a) The immaturity and mental capacity of the
child. (Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Lester, 242
S.W. 2d 714; K eck v. lTT oodring, 208 P. 2d
1133; Moseley Y. Kansas City, 228 P. 2d 699;
Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Earles' Admin.is., 22
s.w. 2d 929.)
(b) The dangerousness of the device causing the
injury. (Giddings v. Superior Oil Co., 235 P.
8
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~d

84:3; Kahn v. James Burton Co., 126 N.E.
2d 836.)
(c) The sufficiency of the care exercised by the
O\Yner. (Giddings v. Superior Oil Co., supra;
Ford v. Blythe Bros. Co., 87 S.E. 2d 879;
Svienty v. Penn. R. Co., 132 N.E. 2d 83; Harris v. Mentes-Williams Co., 95 A. 2d 388.)
(d) The attractiveness of the danger to children.
(Kahn v. Jar;nes Burton Co., supra; Ford v.
Blythe Bors. Co., supra.; Keck v. Woodrin.g,
supra.; Verrichia v. Society Di M.S. Del Laxio,
79 lA. 2d 237.)
We submit that the questions involved in this case,
when controverted, are the kinds of questions which
should go to the trier of fact.
(3) Certainly the trial judge was obligated to consider the pleadings and other matters of record in a light
most favorable to the plaintiff.
"A Court should not direct a verdict in favor
of a defendant unless the evidence is wholly lacking to prove some issue necessary to support the
plaintiff's claim and unless no reasonable or logical inferences may be drawn by the jury based
upon the evidence which would support the plaintiff's claim. That general rule has so often been
stated by this and other Courts that it may be said
to have become elementary.'' (Ellerbeck v. Continental Casualty Co., 63 U. 530, 227 Pac. 805)
In the Utah case of Christiansen v. L. A. & S. L. R.
R. Co., reported in 77 Utah 85, 291 Pac. 926, p. 90, the
Court has this to say:
''The evidence on these issues was in dispute,

9
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but for the purpose of passing on defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the evidence must be
considered and applied most favorable to plaintiff's cause of action. Grossbeck v. Lake Side
Printing Co., 55 Utah 335, 186 P. 103. Plaintiff's
evidence must be taken as true and every legitimate inference drawn in its favor. 1\1abetto v.
Wolfe. (Cal. App. 289 P. 218)."
In the Utah case of Robinson v. Salt Lake City, reported in 37 Utah 520, 109 Pac. 817, pp. 527, 528 of the
1Jtah Reports, the Supreme Court in deciding the propriety of a non-suit granted by the lower court, said:
''True the evidence may not be overwhelming,
nor even strong on some of the points, and it may
even tend to show contributory negligence; but
whether the evidence is strong or weak, or whether
there is some evidence of contributory negligence
or not, is not the test. The test is ''Thether or not
there is some substantial evidence in support of
every essential fact which a. plaintiff is required
to prove in order to entitle him to recover. If the
evidence and the inferences are of the character
. Nhich
.
would authorize reasonable men to arriYe
at different conclusions with respect to "\Yhether
all the essential facts vvere or were not proven, the
question is one of fact and not of law. This is so
although the evidence on some points may be unsatisfactory or doubtful. (Bro,Yn v. Salt Lake City,
33 Utah, 242, 93 Pac. 570, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 619,
126 Am. St. Rep. 828.) This has so often been said
by the courts that the rule has become elementary.''
We submit that obviously the trial judge did not
consider and apply the alleged facts in a manner most
favorable to the plaintiff, that this "\Yas error, and that
this appellate court must now do so.
10
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PoiNT

II.

THE DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE TO THE
PLAINTIFF UNDER WHAT IS COMMONLY
CALLED THE PLAYGROUND DOCTRINE.

Where a person maintains a yard and it is known
to be a place where children habitually play, whether
by permission or not, persons knowing of this fact must
use reasonable care to keep the area safe for children
'vho may come upon it, or to take reasonable steps to
exclude them from the property. The placing upon the
property of any objects which a reasonable person might
know could injure children playing on such property, is
negligence.
Under the Playground Rule, if an owner or person
in control of property knows, or has reason to know that
children habitually play upon his land to the extent that
it becomes known as a playground, he is bound to exercise reasonable care to see that the premises are safe for
the purpose or must at least warn of known dangerous
conditions. (Personal Injury, Actions-Defense-Damages, by Louis R. Frumer and R. L. Benoit, Section
103(2).)
If we examine the deposition of Thomas B. Child,
the owner of the premises on which the accident occurred, and consider the testimony and record most favorable to the plaintiff and against the defendant, it is
difficult to come to any other conclusion except that the
premises had been made by the defendant into a park, at
least semi-public. The defendant took great pride in his

11
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alleged works of art which he carved from stone and
arranged at various points around the property. He was
flattered by the newspaper publicity and admits that the
place was a point of interest to many, many people in
the area, both young and old. The testimony of Thomas
B. Child cited in the Statement of Facts to the effect that
he chased children from the yard almost constantly, or
told them that they had no right to be therein, is ample
evidence that the defendant knew of the propensity of
children in the neighborhood to be attracted into the
yard and to play therein, and yet he never locked the gate
or took precautions to exclude them from the yard. He
would even have us believe that little children would procure wire cutters and go through the fence in order to get
into the yard. If this is true, the attraction of the premises must have been overpowering indeed:

'' Q. How big were the

holes~

A. Well, just big enough for them to get through.

Q. How did they break through~ Did they break
the wire in the fence~
A. Yes, break the wire and unwire it from the
steel posts.

Q. What did they do, cut it with

clippers~

A. Well, sometimes, and sometimes they undo the
fastenings and things.'' (Deposition, Thomas
M. Child, p. 35, lines 2-9.)

'' Q. Do you mean to tell me these little children
cut through this quarter-inch fence periodically~

A. Well, some of it isn't quarter~inch. Some of
it was patched out over to the other building

12
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by the neighbor's fence, and they had toggled
that over there through it so that some of the
fence was built a long while and toggled out
over to the other buildings, which wouldn't
be in my property at all, but it was fenced and
was blocked off.'' (Deposition, Thomas B.
Child, p. 35, lines 28-30 ; p. 36, lines 1-5.)
The picture of little children armed with wire cutters cutting their way into the defendant's yard in order
to play among the various items of curiosity to be found
there is, of course, unbelievable. However, it does demonstrate that the defendant was fully aware of the powerful attractive features of the property and of the propensity of little children to come onto the property
to play.
The boy, Eddie Hoogland, had on many occasions
played on the premises among the many interesting and
curious objects to be found thereon, and on the date of
the accident entered the premises through a gap in the
fence and observed a drum containing a quantity of SealTex, an explosive compound. The plaintiff in attempting
to see what was contained in the barrel which did not
have a cap on it, lit a match, and the resultant explosion
caused the loss of both legs and other permanent injuries.
The affidavit in opposition to the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, as well as the depositions,
raised an issue of fact as to whether or not defendants
should have been aware that the property was used as a
playground by children in the area, and should have,
therefore, taken precautions against storing on the prop13
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erty materials that might injure children playing thereon.
These are issues for a finding of fact and are not issues
that can be determined on a Motion for Summary Judgment. Even the credibility of the defendants' statements
in their affidavits and depositions is a question for the
jury and their statements have been traversed.
''Here we start with the general proposition
that issues of negligence, including such related
issues as contributory negligence, are ordinarily
susceptible to summary adjudication either for or
against the claimant, but should be resolved by
trial in the ordinary manner....
''If in the above situation there have been, or
in any situation there is, a. real issue as to the credibility or the moving party does not satisfy his
burden of clearly establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, then under basic principles, the motion for summary judgment should
be denied.'' (Moore, Federal Practice, Sec.
56.17 ( 42) . )
PoiNT

III.

THE DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE TO THE
PLAINTIFF UNDER THE DOCTRINE COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE.
Ordinarily a person need not secure his property
against excursion of persons not invited upon the property even if these persons are children of immature judgment. The exception to this rule is that if an owner maintains on the property any object or thing which a reasonably prudent person should foresee might attract children upon the premises then, unless he takes reasonable

14
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precautions to secure the premises against the intrusion
of children attracted by the objects upon the property,
he is not entitled to set up as a defense the trespass of
the child.
According to Restatement of Torts, Section 339, the
doctrine is applicable if: (1) the owner or person in possession knows or should know that children are likely to
trespass on place where the condition is maintained; and
(2) the condition is one which the owner or possessor
knows and realizes or should know and realize involves
unreasonable risk of harm to children.
Under the facts of this case it is hard to conceive of
a situation which more strongly impels the application
of the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine. The defendant had
created a park of the property, decorated with curious
and unusual carvings and stone work, the interpretation
and meaning of which was a puzzlement to most of those
who came upon the property, and it was well known to
him and his familythat the premises had drawn people
from all over the area to observe and wonder at the
curiosities which the defendant had created on the
premises. Certainly, it is a question for the jury as to
whether or not these things would excite the natural
curiosity of children who appreciate no property lines
when they are moved by the spirit of adventure to explore and examine such an intriguing property as the
defendants made of this one. The defendant did not
secure his premises, and indicates in his deposition that
he constantly had to chastise children and advise them

15
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that they could not play on the property. Even with this
knowledge he did not even close the gate, and left on the
property acids and other dangerous things that the most
reckless person would appreciate created a danger to
the children playing thereon. (Deposition, Thomas B.
Child, p. 22, lines 18-20.)

'' Q. You have chased a lot of kids out of your
yard~

A. Yes, sir. Any time they are in there and I see
them, out they go.''
'' Q. Why don't you lock your

gate~

A. Because I use my yard for other things, and
we come in from the back rather than opening
the gates and coming in from 8th East and
having the traffic next to my house.
Q. Did you have a lot of
~A.

traffic~

Sure. That's how we haul our scaffold and
things into the shed and come in and take the
stuff, and that is the way we use them.

Q. You don't make any effort to close your gates
after you go in~

A. No." (Deposition, Thomas B. Child, p. 23,
lines 6-16.)
That the defendant had extended an implied invitation to all persons who wished to come upon the premises
and view the many curiosities, can scarcely be denied.
(Deposition, Thomas B. Child, p. 24, lines 3-30.)

''Q. And these stone monuments that you have cut
out are in your yard~
A. Yes.
16
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Q. And they are there for exhibition purposes,
aren't they 1
A. Not particular. I have never asked anybody
to come there to see my stuff. If they want
to come, it is all right. If they do not, it is
all right because it is always in a state of experimentation, and I am not trying to induce
anybody to come into my yard.

Q. You are kind of proud to have people come to
look at those stone monuments you have
carved out, aren't you~
A. In a general way. I am like anybody else. I like
- when I do something that is noteworthy, I
am willing to have it expressed.

Q. You have never put limitation on the age of
the people that can come and walk around
the yard and look at those things, have you~
A. No. No, sir.

Q. So you have seen people of all ages come to
look at your work on these monuments,
haven't you~
A. Yes.

Q. Over a period of

time~

A. Yes.

Q. In fact, the newspapers have run quite a story
on your yard and the spectacular monuments,
carvings that have been made in there~
A. They have run a story a time or two.''
The defendant having admitted that he held the property out to all who desired to come and enter and examine
the premises certainly has taken upon himself an obligation to keep those premises safe, and the storing of acids
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and chemicals thereon can scarcely meet the standard of
care under these circumstances. In any event, this would
be a matter for the jury to determine. If the Attractive
Nuisance Doctrine does not apply in this case it is because
there is no need for its application, the plaintiff being
one of a group of the public who occupy the status of
invitees to enter upon the property.
The Attractive Nuisance Doctrine is applicable in
Utah, as cited in Brow·n v. Salt Lake City, supra, wherein
the Court stated that if the attractive nuisance is artificial,
uncommon, dangerous and attractive, and may, with reasonable effort and expense, be guarded and made reasonably safe, then the duty to make it so may not be
disregarded.
The defendants in arguing to the court below contended that the object itself must be the thing that lures
the child upon the premises in order for the Attractive
Nuisance Doctrine to apply, and urged the court that a
barrel with an opening in the top was not such an attractive nuisance. While it is conceded that the doctrine is not
treated the same by all courts, the better reasoned decisions do not make any such fine distinction, and hold that
it is sufficient that the defendant could reasonably anticipate that children might be lured upon the property and
then injured by some object thereon. In the case of Lone
Sta.r Gas Co. v. Parsons, 14 Pac. 2d 369, the court pointed
out that it is immaterial whether the object itself lured
the infant upon the premises so long as the owner of the
premises could reasonably anticipate that a child would
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be attracted thereon, and onc·e upon· the premise.s would
observe and be:· att11acted to: the object which aetually
injured him.
Also, in Little v. McCord, 151 S.W. 835, th.e, court
pointed out that if children are attracte.d upon the premises because of some existing attraction, a condition.
exists which the. owner cannot ignore in casting upon the.
premises explosive substances which the children wo.uld
be attracted to after entering the premises.
To the same e:ffiect is. Vills v. Cloq.uet, 138 N.W. 33
'vhere a child came in contact with explosives which he
observed' after he was attracted on to the premises. Defendants urged to. the cou.rt. below that by reason of the
plaintiff's age the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine could
not be applied. However, as set forth in the affidavit in
opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the
mental age of the plaintiff was less than eight years of
age, and this fact is amply demonstrated by the deposition
of the child. The cases hold that it is not a matter of
chronological age, but a question of whether or not the
child was of sufficient maturity for him to appreciate
the implication of his actions, and this question is one for
the jury. Keck v. Woodring, supra; Powers v. Harlow,
19 N.W. 257.
CONCLUSION
The defendants in this motion seek to have this
Court rule as a matter of law that one who maintains a
yard containing the most unusual curiosities and invites
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the public to come thereon to enjoy them and who knows
that children frequently use the yard as a playground,
cannot be liable as a matter of law for storing thereon
dangerous substances that any reasonable person should
know would be attractive to children. We respectfully
submit that this is not the law, and that the issues in this
case should be submitted to a jury and that to sustain
the lower court's granting of the Motion for Summary
Judgment would establish a principle that would be contrary to law and the public interest.
Respectfully submitted,
REGNAL· W. GARFF, JR.,
FRANKLYN B. MATHESON, and
GORDON I. HYDE

Attorneys for
Plaintiff and Appellant
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